tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9192597712746432631.post4269528938717840669..comments2024-03-09T09:06:35.288+00:00Comments on Notes from Two Scientific Psychologists: A taxonomy of informationAndrewhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16732977871048876430noreply@blogger.comBlogger9125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9192597712746432631.post-569975908471076802017-11-23T15:56:10.902+00:002017-11-23T15:56:10.902+00:00I've been meaning to respond to this for a whi...I've been meaning to respond to this for a while and now I finally have time for a quick question!<br /><br />Why do you place linguistic information at Pole 1 for Specificity? Certainly it's specific to the dynamics of vocal articulation, but linguistic info isn't About that, unless you're a baby first learning to speak. As you pointed out, my using the word "dog" is not specific to me having perceived a dog that is present, even if it's About one. And if I've let down my friend Mark and he says "it's fine," his words are not specific to him actually being fine or to him being upset, even though his words are About his mental state. It seems like Aboutness should affect classification along the Specificity axis.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9192597712746432631.post-53272537342556759862013-07-09T15:57:11.529+01:002013-07-09T15:57:11.529+01:00I blogged some comments about information and mean...I blogged some comments about information and meaning recently, ( http://anti-ism-ism.blogspot.nl/2013/06/codes-information-meaning-and.html ) and have the feeling what you are describing in some cases is in fact a code that links an information structure to meaning. <br /><br />Where I can see great use for the taxonomy is the concept of codified assemblies: multiple codes that together produce meaning or a novel structure. This concept is f.i. used to describe how different genetic and epigenetic operations (transcription, splicing, synthesis, etc.) eventually lead to construction of a cell. As in molecular biology, your taxonomy seems to be functional so one wonders whether they could act as an assembly as well.<br /><br />A comment on learning as a separate function that I need to give much more thought, but here goes:<br /><br />When is learning, learning? Which is to say, there are quite a few things I do each day, that I have never done before. I've never written the exact words in this post in a sequence before, this morning I constructed a swing for my daughter for the first time and this evening I will try my new rib rub recipe on the BBQ. <br /><br />If you zoom in on these things, time-scale wise, and try to find out about novel information structures that I have to coordinate with, the numbers are mind boggling. Learning seems to be a description of coordination on a very specific range of timescales, the ones slow enough so we can observe change as a gradual process.<br /><br />I do believe the term coordination is correct as a general term to describe these phenomena.<br /><br />I often use the BigDog on ice video as an example: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cNZPRsrwumQ <br />In this video around 50secs BigDog walks like Bambi on ice, slips and recovers and slips and recovers. Very much coordination going on. This is repeated in slow-motion.<br /><br />None of the movements are pre-programmed, this thing runs on an old pentium computer and a go-cart engine. There is an algorithm that basically selects in real time the most stable solution from information streams of three time scales: real time sensor info/energy needs (fast), goals/heading (medium), fuel supply, motor status (slow).<br /><br />The thing is, the stable solution selection, the coordination, when slowed down resembles using some learned skill and applying it just like the examples I gave above. All the learning was however done by the engineers and was constructed into the robot by its design (in a way: as a memory of that learning process). <br /><br />Same way, humans benefit from the learning that was done by natural selection and our coordination with structures that take some time, are at a general level, not very different or perhaps mostly calibration. <br />Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01414244802603249395noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9192597712746432631.post-72663136774995444092013-04-02T07:44:47.282+01:002013-04-02T07:44:47.282+01:00Thank you for your responses, I am grappling with ...Thank you for your responses, I am grappling with the understanding of how invariant features can exist and not in an objective perspective (and instantly felt horribly biased by philosophy). Either way, thanks again, looking forward to future posts from you both._https://www.blogger.com/profile/02742471168384347161noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9192597712746432631.post-77996574338293845002013-03-31T13:49:53.178+01:002013-03-31T13:49:53.178+01:00Some terminology:
Arrays have structure, by defin...Some terminology:<br /><br />Arrays have structure, by definition. The optic array, for example, is a structured light field. (A homogeneous light field (<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ganzfeld_effect" rel="nofollow">a Ganzfeld</a>) will stimulate light receptors but does not lead to the perception of anything.)<br /><br />So, your (a) doesn't work, but the other two are fine. You can also add 'there is an energy array but it doesn't contain the structure of relevance'. <a href="The" rel="nofollow">In the case of the outfielder problem</a>, if you aren't running correctly, neither the linear optical trajectory nor the cancelled optical acceleration are present in the array.<br /><br />This, by the way, is the sense I had in mind when I said structure can come in and out of existence. Invariant features of the optic array can be there or not there at different points in time.Andrewhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16732977871048876430noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9192597712746432631.post-77501705254277524162013-03-24T15:07:01.254+00:002013-03-24T15:07:01.254+00:00I am not entirely sure about the first part, it se...I am not entirely sure about the first part, it seems to me it just moves the issue from the concept of affordances to that of information. Your last sentence however leads me to the conclusion that the concepts involved needs to be more specifically defined (not implying we thought of them as perfect to begin with). <br /><br />Structure cannot "come in and out of existence", that would rely on us perceiving the same particles, which we are not (I understand this is not what you are saying, I'm just clarifying for myself). However, structure can exist and not exist. Structure is only information if perceived. I think I want to stick to 'perceived' as opposed to 'precipitate behaviour' here though, I'm just temporarily erring on the side of caution, since I am unsure if not it may have consequences for cases where we do perceive a structure (even consciously) and realise an affordance but do not act on it -realisation but not actualisation. Unless you want to define behaviour as 'sensory receptor change'. I feel like there are things that we perceive but do not affect behaviour. Work under progress.<br /><br />Either way, there are then three ways in which information can not exist, when a) there exist an energy array but it does not elicit a structure (I sense issues here, due to dividing 'energy array' and 'structure' -I am unsure if it might not be better to combine them in one concept, also this work under progress), b) there exist an energy array eliciting a structure but it is not perceived (because the agent doesn't have sensory receptors for it, or, the agent is simply not perceiving it), and c) there does not exist an energy array (and thus there can't exist a structure). I think this needs some work still by explicating the full practical consequences, but I suggest it valuable in order to produce clarity of the concepts and not be confused by, or elicit confusion in readers, about the whole existence/non-existence type stuff (which I may have inadvertently started in the first place =D)._https://www.blogger.com/profile/02742471168384347161noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9192597712746432631.post-29848743538614041422013-03-24T09:19:01.870+00:002013-03-24T09:19:01.870+00:00I think the confusion comes from not keeping affor...I think the confusion comes from not keeping affordances and information about affordances separate. Affordances persist (they are dispositions) but information about affordances comes in and out of existence (as the light changes, or as the organism moves appropriately or not). It's vital to keep these separate.<br /><br />Not all structure in energy arrays serves as information, which I think is part of what Sabrina is up to here. It's information if it's involved in behaviour somehow, otherwise it's just structure.Andrewhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16732977871048876430noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9192597712746432631.post-82338593083861868482013-03-22T12:55:51.503+00:002013-03-22T12:55:51.503+00:00Patric,
I think your distinction is valuable.Patric,<br /><br />I think your distinction is valuable.mhowardthomashttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02459583065826677391noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9192597712746432631.post-49729587032825395492013-03-21T17:17:54.926+00:002013-03-21T17:17:54.926+00:00I didn't need to use an abstract temporal exam...I didn't need to use an abstract temporal example, sorry about that, it suffices to exemplify it in this way; epistemologically, my behaviour is not precipitated by the information of the rock standing facing away from it, or, not having perceived it (say walked backwards out in a field), i.e. it doesn't exist. But the information is still "out there" though, right? Am I nitpicking? I feel nitpicky._https://www.blogger.com/profile/02742471168384347161noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9192597712746432631.post-90465183641559085932013-03-21T16:59:57.642+00:002013-03-21T16:59:57.642+00:00Information as defined by "any structure in a...Information as defined by "any structure in an energy array that precipitates behaviour in an organism" I believe might lead to some unwanted ontological issues. The argument against that I propose however, relies on that the above quote is an ontological definition of information and not an epistemological one. So if it is an e-one and not an o-one, read no further =).<br /><br />I argue my point on the basis of temporal and realism-congruent aspects. The information that a (smallish) rock reflects in an energy array lends itself to be realised by you and me to be pick-up-able (and actualisable as such). A redwood tree's information does not. However, following from your definition, before life on earth, the information of the rock did not exist; if your ontological definition of information includes precipitation of behaviour, then, if no agent's behaviour is precipitated, the information did not exist (and idealism we want to avoid, right?).<br /><br />With this said, epistemologically, information does indeed need to precipitate behaviour otherwise we can't have direct perception, or probably perception at all and it turns quite non-sensical -therefore it is an important aspect in how the relationship works. I certainly think that everything else in your post takes us a far way in the application of information and how to structure it sensically (as if that word would be the antonym to non-sensical.. ha.. ha.. ha..). Although it is way above my head to comply to your request at the end of the post..<br /><br />Actualisation and realisation (to be consistent with realism and pragmatic aspects) I believe necessarily depends on information the way you define it, without the ontological assumption that it needs to precipitate behaviour but with the epistemological assumption that it does._https://www.blogger.com/profile/02742471168384347161noreply@blogger.com