tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9192597712746432631.post2908765021662055087..comments2024-03-09T09:06:35.288+00:00Comments on Notes from Two Scientific Psychologists: Visual illusions and direct perceptionAndrewhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16732977871048876430noreply@blogger.comBlogger5125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9192597712746432631.post-82719746116522879442016-07-04T13:13:43.455+01:002016-07-04T13:13:43.455+01:00It's just occurred to me that this is effectiv...It's just occurred to me that this is effectively a restating of Withagen's idea; he also proposes that the individual variation is caused by our differing ability to interact with the picture, but he frames it in terms of access to information variables that support the various uses.Andrewhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16732977871048876430noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9192597712746432631.post-13019524541594079862015-03-06T07:27:38.080+00:002015-03-06T07:27:38.080+00:00Thank you for your analysis, because it's real...Thank you for your analysis, because it's really useful for me.Widelwenhttp://www.widelwen.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9192597712746432631.post-75474259729343120482015-03-05T23:33:11.868+00:002015-03-05T23:33:11.868+00:00This comment has been removed by a blog administrator.Kata Kata Bijakhttp://www.tipnoten.com/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9192597712746432631.post-1509803673196444482014-09-30T14:31:34.700+01:002014-09-30T14:31:34.700+01:00"Currently, for Gibson and the ecological app..."Currently, for Gibson and the ecological approach in general, in order for an optical variable to be information, it has to specify. Withagen thinks this is a problem and that illusions really do point this problem out. However, his ecological solution is to simply relax the specification requirement and allow organisms to vary in how tight their perceptual, epistemic contact with the world is."<br /><br />I remain suspicious of this. <i>IF</i> we are to go this direction, <i>then</i> the most obvious thing to do is to simply define perception as a connection with the world through specifying invariants. This seems to me to be a crucial part of Gibson, of TSM, and of Tony's 2.0. By this route, to say that some individual's connection with some aspect of the the world is <i>not</i> through specifying invariants, is to say that it is <i>not</i> perceptual. <br /><br />"What are they then?" you might ask. I think Gibson would say that they are cognition, and that in such cases the standard psychology account is <i>relatively</i> accurate. He would say that the interesting question is how far you can push perception (as defined above), before you need to resort to those other things. While I could support that with many quotes, frankly, I don't think this a deeply held first principle. Rather, I suspect it was a simple acknowledgement that he had a more vested interest in some questions in psychology, and that this necessitated the neglect of other questions. <br /><br />The problem is, I think, that Gibson and TSM rightly resist the inclusion of non-specifying energy patterns in <i>perception</i>, because once you do that it is much less clear how the ecological approach is unique. If there is some pattern the organism is responding to, and that pattern does specify something, but the something isn't the thing we think it <i>should</i> be... that is a very different situation than one in which we allow non-specifying patterns into the perception story. <br /><br />I will have to read the article to see where exactly it stands on this. I note that the excerpt above (which I really like!) does not use the word perception. <br /><br />P.S. I can't resist mentioning that Gibson-on-illusions grows naturally out of Holt-on-illusions. If you are working on this seriously without at least skimming my chapter on that topic, I am going to be offended. :- (Eric Charleshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17412168482569793996noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9192597712746432631.post-82542598671228878362014-09-23T21:18:21.736+01:002014-09-23T21:18:21.736+01:00Another way of accounting for the perplexities of ...Another way of accounting for the perplexities of the Müller–Lyer diagram is to conceive of its affordances in terms of representational potential. As competent users of depictive representations we can use the Mülller–Lyer as a spatial depiction or else we can use it as a flat rendering of black marks. People unfamiliar with depictive representations (what Hudson (1960) described this as "pictorially illiteracy") are not susceptible to such illusions (as Segal et al also recorded) and therefore they are only capable of using the Müller-Lyer as what Donald Brook calls a "Matching representation". The vital thing to bear in mind here is that perception is by no means a conceptual skill. That means to say that perception is a non-inferential capacity to put things to communicative use. I have written about this in much more depth here:<br />http://thoughtsonartandteaching.blogspot.co.uk/2014/03/difficulties-for-philosophy-of-illusion.html#tpJim Hamlynhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16488331333061422244noreply@blogger.com