tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9192597712746432631.post3402708125688394096..comments2024-03-09T09:06:35.288+00:00Comments on Notes from Two Scientific Psychologists: Function vs Structure (A Purple Peril)Andrewhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16732977871048876430noreply@blogger.comBlogger12125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9192597712746432631.post-88933840846019909402015-06-24T03:27:42.768+01:002015-06-24T03:27:42.768+01:00I wonder how this relates to this science of psych...I wonder how this relates to this science of psychiatry and even anti-psychiatry? Just wondering?!John Robinsonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04409996658987374061noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9192597712746432631.post-24587005428720158282015-05-03T08:13:17.551+01:002015-05-03T08:13:17.551+01:00It seems to me that while you may have a fairly go...It seems to me that while you may have a fairly good definition of structure, you need to define function better. Because different nexi of the structure will also have a structural function (spandrel like) - which is often neglected.<br /><br />But the biggest problem is that neuroscientists often talk about function with structure in mind (e.g. when conflating collocating functions in the brain with other functions and drawing causal connections) and, of course, it's hard to even imagine how the structure would be studied without some function in mind. Even at the level of the neuron people refer to connections in a rather anthropomorphic way.<br /><br />And of course, the so called 'functions' will also have some built in structures that may get overlooked as such. This leads to what I've called the 'isomorphism fallacy' - the assumption that the structures one idenfies in 'cognition' (most broadly conceived from perception to language or social cognition) must have neural correlates that can map onto them - the hidden assumption behind phrenology and localism. Or, going the other way, that now that we know the brain uses connected networks, we must look for hitherto unnoticed connected networks in thought, language, perception, etc. (http://metaphorhacker.net/2011/03/the-brain-is-a-bad-metaphor-for-language/).<br /><br />Perhaps a better way would be to come up with a construction-grammar-like approach to always consider function-structure pairings at the level where structure and function can reasonably be seen as paired rather than imagine two floating but somehow interconnected worlds of structure and function. This is how I am interpreting you embodiment approach and why I think it's so important. But I feel it's key not to try to overgeneralize it out of all context.Dominik Lukešhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03071876778771965740noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9192597712746432631.post-3206160713574972112015-04-27T14:26:23.665+01:002015-04-27T14:26:23.665+01:00Greg, I obviously can't speak for Andrew, but....Greg, I obviously can't speak for Andrew, but... to address your concern... I find that I almost never have a problem talking with neuroscientists, while I frequently run into difficulty talking with cognitive neuroscientists. That is, I don't think anyone in this discussion has a problem with research into the biological structure of the brain, and, to the contrary, are fascinated by it. Also, we tend to get a long with brain people. <br /><br />The question is whether we have jumped ahead of ourselves in the pursuit of "cognitive neuroscience." <br /><br />Those trying to merge their perfectly good neuroscience with a faulty theory of psychology will run into predictable problems. If we are right, billions of research dollars have been spent in the pursuit of the neural equivalent of aether or phlogiston. While that research won't exactly amount to nothing in the future, it will amount to very little in light of the money invested. Given that, for the past 20 years or so, results in cognitive neuroscience have been generally considered not-worth-citing 2-4 years after publication, even the tippy top journals, it is not an absurd position. Eric Charleshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17412168482569793996noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9192597712746432631.post-66454826382880897112015-04-24T16:57:21.153+01:002015-04-24T16:57:21.153+01:00Andrew will probably convey this much more eloquen...Andrew will probably convey this much more eloquently and concisely, but: Tim van Gelder addresses this in his paper The Dynamical Hypothesis in Cognitive Science (full text: http://goo.gl/DqowpA). In fact, this is a common objection to the Dynamical Hypothesis, that computation is somehow needed. I would refer to sections 6.3, 6.4, and 6.9 in which van Gelder replies to objections that dynamical systems are computers or computable (6.3 and 6.4) or that an understanding of structure requires a computational approach (6.9).<br /><br />I think that Computationalists and Dynamicists are interested in different things (this doesn't necessarily mean they are mutually exclusive, though). Dynamics is all about change over time, whereas the former abstracts away from that, to some extent. Dynamicists talk about states geometrically, in terms of position w/r/t other states of the system, whereas Computionalists tend to focus more on the internal combinations of syntactic structure. (I hope I am not misconstruing anything, it's not my intention).<br /><br />Sophiehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06099322082411935035noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9192597712746432631.post-40710699538018748232015-04-24T16:33:27.062+01:002015-04-24T16:33:27.062+01:00For those with an interest in this kind of thing: ...For those with an interest in this kind of thing: the Walter J. Freeman who co-authored the non-representational neuroscience article (with Skarda) linked to above is the son of the infamous Walter J. Freeman II who performed thousands of so-called "icepick" lobotomies.Sophiehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06099322082411935035noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9192597712746432631.post-35980386358821479762015-04-23T23:04:31.336+01:002015-04-23T23:04:31.336+01:00Hi Andrew,
Thanks for the blog and the good conv...Hi Andrew, <br /><br />Thanks for the blog and the good conversations. Most of it is over my head but here are two questions: <br /><br />1 - Could those "basic mechanisms" be computing AND being parts of nonlinear dynamic systems?<br /><br />2 - Even if the structures do not "lock down" function, do they constrain the possibilities for function?<br />Todd Hargrovehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17556388922969976238noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9192597712746432631.post-71729170897194794032015-04-23T19:12:39.599+01:002015-04-23T19:12:39.599+01:00The structure surely provides clues, though. The structure surely provides clues, though. Brad Buchsbaumhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10757537675625801119noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9192597712746432631.post-27014515823288344972015-04-23T14:01:23.866+01:002015-04-23T14:01:23.866+01:00Yes, but those basic mechanisms might be computing...Yes, but those basic mechanisms might be computing or they might be being nonlinear dynamical systems or they might do something else. This structure by itself does not uniquely lock down the function of that structure.Andrewhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16732977871048876430noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9192597712746432631.post-91653783796221868572015-04-22T21:44:26.825+01:002015-04-22T21:44:26.825+01:00But this is the wetware that are the building bloc...But this is the wetware that are the building blocks of the implementation. They are part of the structure. E.g., independent of cog sci, it has been noticed that connections between brain areas tends to be massively reciprocal. In fact, feedback connections sometimes outnumber feedforward connections. This architecture constrains cognitive models. Greg Hickokhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16656473495682901613noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9192597712746432631.post-22595508933460669222015-04-22T21:27:38.587+01:002015-04-22T21:27:38.587+01:00Almost nothing you mention is about the implementa...Almost nothing you mention is about the implementation of any specific cognitive process, so they aren't what I'm talking with regards to 'structure'. Andrewhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16732977871048876430noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9192597712746432631.post-9136165732961403792015-04-22T16:31:37.222+01:002015-04-22T16:31:37.222+01:00Surely you don't mean to imply that neuroscien...Surely you don't mean to imply that neuroscientists have wasted their time in the discovery of the neuron, action potential, synaptic transmission, neurotransmitters, connectivity patterns, spike timing dependent plasticity, the laminar structure of cortex, etc etc etc. Otherwise, we would have to wait indefinitely while we sort out our functional analyses before starting research on the brain. Your therefore disagree with yourself: research on structure and function *in parallel* is the best approach to a complete understanding. Greg Hickokhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16656473495682901613noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9192597712746432631.post-37142860645472543272015-04-22T13:08:58.602+01:002015-04-22T13:08:58.602+01:00Here's a systems theoretic view of what work n...Here's a systems theoretic view of what work needs to be done before one has licence to use the "function" word: https://onesecondpersecond.wordpress.com/2014/12/11/that-little-word-function/Fredhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12698509790614656032noreply@blogger.com