tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9192597712746432631.post5247525427532764587..comments2024-03-09T09:06:35.288+00:00Comments on Notes from Two Scientific Psychologists: Specification and Some of Its Consequences (A Purple Peril)Andrewhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16732977871048876430noreply@blogger.comBlogger3125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9192597712746432631.post-6366467906155384472015-04-19T20:58:02.218+01:002015-04-19T20:58:02.218+01:00"Can you be more specific about what you mean..."Can you be more specific about what you mean about vagueness? What's an example?"<br /><br />:-)<br /><br />Irony aside though, I suspect that the ideas I've had in mind are mainly situations as you describe - where there is insufficient information, though also situations in which the information is present but I am unable to attune to it due to lack of ability.<br /><br />There is a metacognitive aspect to the experience that's interesting and important. I know what kind of thing to do, but not what specific thing. <br /><br />For instance, in a conversation I might know that I'm supposed to comfort someone, but have no idea how to do so. Or in a game of soccer I might know I should pass the ball to a teammate making a run, but also know that I probably can't. The inadequacy of the information is not simply revealed by my failure - my experience of the situation is one in which failure is the most likely outcome even before the attempt is made.Marekhttp://www.doingyourmind.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9192597712746432631.post-58743252351727568932015-04-16T11:25:47.871+01:002015-04-16T11:25:47.871+01:00My intuition is that standard ecological approache...<i>My intuition is that standard ecological approaches deal well with the clearly bounded domains where the dynamics can be specified 1:1, but that much cognition happens as a means to get us from more nebulous situations into those more cleanly defined ones.</i><br />This is certainly true. The specification story is not the complete story of information, which is complicated because of all the important things specification makes possible. <br /><br />Can you be more specific about what you mean about vagueness? What's an example?<br /><br />At a first pass, it's unlikely the 'vagueness' will create information. However, 'vagueness' might be the experience of inadequate/insufficient information, with that inadequacy revealed when you try to achieve some behaviour using that information and fail because it's not up to the job. Andrewhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16732977871048876430noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9192597712746432631.post-44980574088261449762015-04-13T20:07:44.137+01:002015-04-13T20:07:44.137+01:00I haven't read much of the literature on this,...I haven't read much of the literature on this, but I have a question on the issue of "vagueness". My intuition is that it is possible to directly perceive vagueness. <br /><br />That we cannot yet act, or that we need more information (in a non-technical sense) to decide what to do is something that is often apparent. Sometimes it comes with a strong sense of how to relieve the ignorance (see Erik Reitveld's philosophical stuff on unreflective action and the Wittgenstinian notion of directed discontent). Sometimes it is simply a matter of confusion and inability to organise action effectively.<br /><br />Saying that there's a 1:1 relationship between a particular vagueness and a particular set of ecological information seems like an odd claim though. It seems to me that the more tolerant forms of the notion might be necessary to allow us as actors to move from situations of uncertainty to situations where there are a clear set of actions with will have concomitant dynamics with which to attune.<br /><br />I may need a whole post of my own to unpack some more of this question, but I'll wrap up with just this:<br /><br />My intuition is that standard ecological approaches deal well with the clearly bounded domains where the dynamics can be specified 1:1, but that much cognition happens as a means to get us from more nebulous situations into those more cleanly defined ones. I know Gibson talks about exploratory behaviour but I haven't read him properly on it. Is there some notion of nested information structures (complex-but-vague task domains within which more specific tasks occur) extant in the theoretical literature?Marekhttp://www.doingyourmind.comnoreply@blogger.com