tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9192597712746432631.comments2024-03-09T09:06:35.288+00:00Notes from Two Scientific PsychologistsAndrewhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16732977871048876430noreply@blogger.comBlogger2254125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9192597712746432631.post-22506411936672157792023-03-08T09:01:11.969+00:002023-03-08T09:01:11.969+00:00Thank you for signposting to this - I have observe...Thank you for signposting to this - I have observed the 'twitter debate' with interest, this is a fascinating area of exploration and debate - would be keen to learn more and hear your deeper thinking...thank youDusty Millernoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9192597712746432631.post-39904150989319940532023-02-11T17:47:49.260+00:002023-02-11T17:47:49.260+00:00Your statement: The job of the brain changes from ...Your statement: The job of the brain changes from "process input into output" to "link body and environment through perception and action", was the 'A-ha' moment I've been looking for for so long. Thank you!Joel MacDonaldnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9192597712746432631.post-91102209460517273302023-02-01T08:27:25.919+00:002023-02-01T08:27:25.919+00:00Revisiting this and thanks again for doing these b...Revisiting this and thanks again for doing these blogs. Question:<br /><br />How might an organism distinguish between a relationship which is lawful and one which has behaved lawfully up to the present but has un-encountered contingencies?Davidnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9192597712746432631.post-33975132475749356252022-12-16T05:26:30.786+00:002022-12-16T05:26:30.786+00:00Dreams are also illusions right from the subconsci...Dreams are also illusions right from the subconscious mind but it has roots from our reality.Thomashttps://swapnduniya.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9192597712746432631.post-84664426965430893222022-12-14T04:27:58.413+00:002022-12-14T04:27:58.413+00:00Do dreams can be classified as the indirect percep...Do dreams can be classified as the indirect perception of our reality?Thomashttps://swapnduniya.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9192597712746432631.post-55730830850381354472022-09-27T17:25:58.728+01:002022-09-27T17:25:58.728+01:00I know very little about this subject, so I'm ...I know very little about this subject, so I'm aware that my arguments may be flimsy, but I'm not really convinced by the "illusions aren't errors" argument<br /><br />In particular, I'm not sure what you mean when you say that a light too dim to be registered is not an error, "simply a result of the way the system works". I agree that this case doesn't fall under the common conception of "error", but can't "errors" (by definition) always be attributed to the way a system works?<br /><br />I'm also kind of uncomfortable with the use of the word "unfair". I mean, I agree that if you intentionally deceive someone, then punish them for the error you provoked, you've been pretty unfair (unless the error can be improved with punishment I guess).<br />But on the other hand, it seems to me that any punishable act can be considered as some kind of error. And it feels like considering something as an error would make it more understandable and less blameworthy, not the reverse; and certainly, in a psychological context, "errors" are rarely considered blameworthy.<br /><br />Of course, calling something an "error" doesn't tell us how it occurred, and so if we want to understand how something works, we sure can't stop at "it's an error!"<br /><br /><br />Sorry if this is unclear... I guess my main question is, do you think the idea of "error" makes sense as a category?<br /><br />If it doesn't, then why not criticize that idea directly?<br /><br />And if it does make some sense, then maybe illusions could be defined as errors occuring in tasks involving description, for example?<br /><br />I guess then we would have to define "description" and so on, and probably it still wouldn't be a perfect category, but then again what is?Ppaunoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9192597712746432631.post-78121370647338377182022-09-25T12:32:59.150+01:002022-09-25T12:32:59.150+01:00" I don't assign a word description to so..." I don't assign a word description to something, I can't remember it. I'd be a terrible police witness."<br />I'm now wondering whether non-imagers might have historically been the drivers of the evolution of language.tnthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05478569541469140077noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9192597712746432631.post-78837789798966035272022-09-25T09:54:32.934+01:002022-09-25T09:54:32.934+01:00This is interesting. The first incidence of someon...This is interesting. The first incidence of someone saying they can't imagine, but do have mental images when they dream.<br />@andrew?tnthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05478569541469140077noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9192597712746432631.post-31121099709918577792022-07-19T00:44:30.788+01:002022-07-19T00:44:30.788+01:00I wonder if you saw Veritasium's recent (How e...I wonder if you saw Veritasium's recent (How electricity actually works) video, and whether you think it's interesting to think about; especially when it comes to electricity in the brain. <br />Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9192597712746432631.post-16005766508271950792022-06-28T01:02:41.589+01:002022-06-28T01:02:41.589+01:00In 2011, TRL completed a study of 50 crossings tha...In 2011, TRL completed a study of 50 crossings that were converted from the older Pelican design (which has the pedestrian signals on the far side of the roadway) to the Puffin design (with pedestrian signals on the near side of the roadway). There was a 17% reduction in personal injury accidents with the new design, most likely because fewer people attempted to start crossing late in the cycle. The offset central refuge is also the result of decades of pedestrian behaviour research. In the US we don't do these things, and consequently we kill and injure a much higher proportion of pedestrians. Here's a link to the 2011 study. https://www.trl.co.uk/publications/ppr507 Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9192597712746432631.post-45579257205560496592022-02-13T17:19:19.261+00:002022-02-13T17:19:19.261+00:00Perceptual Control Theory (PCT) provides a model a...Perceptual Control Theory (PCT) provides a model and understanding of neural processes based on perception rather than prediction that explains how we function and survive in our changing environment.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12384420414616445745noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9192597712746432631.post-35740057734041733352021-12-07T15:15:40.869+00:002021-12-07T15:15:40.869+00:00Do you have any thoughts on how normativity works ...Do you have any thoughts on how normativity works in the dispositional account of affordances (as opposed to the relational approach you briefly mention above)?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9192597712746432631.post-33282077138849808702021-12-03T18:21:43.530+00:002021-12-03T18:21:43.530+00:00"When they do, that interaction is governed b..."When they do, that interaction is governed by ecological scale laws of physics that mean, for example, that a given affordance will produce one and only one pattern in the media, and it will always produce that pattern."<br /><br />In engineering terms, the senses are transducers. They convert one form of energy into another. A microphone transduces mechanical energy (i.e. sound waves) into electromagnetic energy. The ear drum transduces sound waves into bioelectric energy. The ear is not "metaphorically" like a microphone - it is an analog of a microphone - or the other way around - the microphone is an analog of an ear. This holds true across all sense modalities.<br /><br />I think this is a good way of grounding the "law" you mention above. Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9192597712746432631.post-14979948250157140612021-11-27T01:56:59.546+00:002021-11-27T01:56:59.546+00:00CS Peirce:
Consider what [sensible] effects, that ...CS Peirce:<br />Consider what [sensible] effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these [sensible] effects is the whole of our conception of the object.<br />[brackets are my words]<br /><br />W James:<br />Every way of classifying a thing is but a way of handling it for some particular purpose. Conceptions, "kinds" are teleological instruments. No abstract concept can be a valid substitute for a concrete reality except with reference to a particular interest in the conceiver.<br /><br /><br /><br />Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9192597712746432631.post-65157801874784443192021-11-24T20:42:25.000+00:002021-11-24T20:42:25.000+00:00As you are using the terms, I would say that anima...As you are using the terms, I would say that animals have direct perception (non-representational) and humans (as far as we know) are the only animal capable of indirect observation i.e. forming representations.<br /><br />The idea of Representations arises due to our unique ability to "observe" that "we" are "observing" our "observations" of the "things" that we are "observing".<br /><br />Our observations (representations) become "things" every bit as much as the, proverbial, thing in itself. And so does our representation of ourselves.<br /><br />I wouldn't read to much into Locke's (and Newtons) idea of Primary and Secondary characteristics. Neither had quite yet let go of the metaphysics of St. Thomas which was influenced by Plato and Aristotle. Form (i.e. extension) was still rather hazy in their minds and was tied into the inherent geometry of kinematics. And I wouldn't draw to heavily from QM. QM is actually "classical mechanics".Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9192597712746432631.post-15948645246930909842021-11-22T23:50:55.623+00:002021-11-22T23:50:55.623+00:00I agree, I don't think you can tell a plausibl...I agree, I don't think you can tell a plausible story about perception mediated by computational symbolic representation. But I think you make your life too easy by limiting representation to a "computational, information processing system".<br /><br />There are theories of mental representation that make that assumption. Lakoff's Idealized Cognitive Models are constructs I find incredibly useful but Goffman's frames/footing could also be used. Arguably, people feel like the only way to make them make sense of this in the moment of use is computational or try to postulate some sort of neural correlate that does the same thing. But that's not necessary for the theory of mental representation itself.<br /><br />Surely, lots of perception tasks involve some kind of representation. It may not be processed in any sense computationally (and I don't think it is). But it only makes sense if some representation exists. Just try to describe the process of writing the blog post (full of perception tasks) without some notion of mental imagery.<br /><br />Or to think of a contrived perception task. You have baseball pitcher who has to pick up balls from a bucket to pitch. All the balls have pictures of people but the pitcher can only throw the ones with a US president on them. Even though that's as close to a computational task of memory retrieval and pattern matching, I don't think that that's what's happening. But representation of some sort is at least adjacent to the task.<br /><br />You can make it more difficult by saying to the pitcher that they must put a spin on any odd numbered president. Completing this sort of task would require some external look up source for most people - almost perfectly computational. What is happening there? What sort of training would be required to achieve any level of fluency? Would this even be an achievable task for a batter?<br /><br />And I would argue that most direct perception is motivated by or at least adjacent to some sort of representation that is experienced by people who try to turn introspective attention to it as vaguely computational. Which is why indirect perception makes better intuitive sense to most people than direct perception. We can guess at the nature of those representations from the demands of the tasks. But that does not mean we have to postulate them as abstract symbols presented for computation. <br /><br />People with aphantasia are an interesting case. They literally cannot form a mental image of a face but they can still recognise people. So, the representations cannot rely on actual mental images. But we still act as if we had some - that's the only way we can make sense of them. <br /><br />The symbolic computational account is not plausible. But neither is denying that something like representations is somehow involved. What is the alternative ecological psychology has to offer here?Dominik Lukešhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03071876778771965740noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9192597712746432631.post-33652715906512629462021-11-14T10:29:33.230+00:002021-11-14T10:29:33.230+00:00I tried to write a comment in here but it ended up...I tried to write a comment in here but it ended up being too long, so I expanded it into a blog post: https://metaphorhacker.net/2021/11/world-as-a-directly-meaningful-place-a-comment-on-ecological-psychology-and-the-richness-of-human-experience/<br /><br />The thrust of the argument: Yes, I agree that the direct perception model is useful. In fact, I prefer it to the alternatives, but we still need an account of rich mental representations to account for much of our experience of the world in its social and mental context. I give some specific examples, I'd like to have a more plausible account for from ecological psychology.Dominik Lukešhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03071876778771965740noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9192597712746432631.post-74587515507158706892021-11-10T22:39:12.235+00:002021-11-10T22:39:12.235+00:00Do God: The ultimate verbing. This discussion of v...Do God: The ultimate verbing. This discussion of verb-ing nouns reminded me of a clip from the Netflix series "Orange is the New Black" in which a prison inmate explains why she wants to convert to Judaism in this way:<br /><br />"I was raised in a church where I was told to believe and pray. And if I was bad, I’d go to hell. If I was good, I’d go to heaven. If I asked Jesus, he’d forgive me, and that was that. And here, y'all sayin’ it ain’t no hell. Ain’t sure about heaven. And if you do something wrong, you got to figure it out yourself. And as far as God is concerned, it’s yo’ job to keep askin’ questions, and to keep learnin’ and to keep arguing. It’s like a verb. It’s like—you do God. And it’s a lot of work, but I think I’m in."<br /><br />Watching the entire clip is worth it: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jO94rhKJAR8&t=150sStuarthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13200396146729036066noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9192597712746432631.post-20373466054457767392021-11-04T10:22:33.205+00:002021-11-04T10:22:33.205+00:00This was a very interesting read. Thank you for sh...This was a very interesting read. Thank you for sharing your knowledge. You look worried about it not being well written, but I think you made a novice like me understand it.<br /><br />Regarding this issue, a doubt comes to my mind. Could it be said that dispositions are "hidden" properties of objects and that relational properties refer to emergent properties (what emerges from two (complementary) dispositions being in suitable contact?<br /><br />Thank you for reading my message.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9192597712746432631.post-56461547607357808442021-10-26T16:33:59.969+01:002021-10-26T16:33:59.969+01:00This was incredibly clear, so thanks! If you have ...This was incredibly clear, so thanks! If you have any tips on how to formulate a theory of embodied imaginING that is built up from the reenactment of remembered acts of direct perception, I'd be much obliged!Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17872761004931424573noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9192597712746432631.post-10834334935078457812021-10-15T04:37:38.902+01:002021-10-15T04:37:38.902+01:00Following up to the previous comment. Please note...Following up to the previous comment. Please note... I understand that (aside from the meditation condition) there is no task or action specificity in the the papers I shared. However, I'm wondering if we might not apply the model in task specific research. <br /><br />For example, during flow states, dance, or music making, might we observe similar levels of entropy, potentially indicating a transition of consciousness towards a more "unitive" state?<br /><br />Might we capitalize on this model to ask different questions about the organism-environment? How might shifts in whole brain dynamics be affected by the environment, thereby influencing behavior?<br /><br />P.S. I'm truly a noob, and know I don't have a firm grasp on the ecological position. Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07629905653951044678noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9192597712746432631.post-55113450814685793842021-10-15T04:23:47.777+01:002021-10-15T04:23:47.777+01:00Hi, Andrew.
I just found this blog this evening, ...Hi, Andrew.<br /><br />I just found this blog this evening, and can't wait to fully sink my teeth into it all! <br /><br />I'm wondering if you've seen any of the work coming from Selèn Atasoy. She has been using cymatics and harmonic analysis of the whole brain to predict consciousness, etc. To my mind, this seems as though it pairs nicely with Gibson's (1966) comparison of the brain to a "resonator" or "radio." She seems to be taking great care to develop a theory which is both governed by natural laws and generalizable.<br /><br />There are several useful papers, but the following are a good start:<br /><br />https://www.nature.com/articles/ncomms10340<br />https://www.biorxiv.org/content/biorxiv/early/2020/08/10/2020.08.10.244459.full.pdf<br /><br />I'm just starting to look into this as a student in the program at UConn (also interested in developing an ecological neuroscience and **maybe** bringing qualia {GASP!!} into the discussion), and would love to here your thoughts... if you find it at all interesting, that is.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07629905653951044678noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9192597712746432631.post-55043617973180523762021-05-21T01:06:09.788+01:002021-05-21T01:06:09.788+01:00Wow, three articles in a row! Must be my birthday!...Wow, three articles in a row! Must be my birthday!<br />Thank you :)Romahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14289859845074097347noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9192597712746432631.post-72774623963863742032021-05-17T14:50:03.385+01:002021-05-17T14:50:03.385+01:00I have been pondering for a while whether a model ...I have been pondering for a while whether a model that operates with "lego blocks" that are larger than neurons but more comcrete than you might find in a typical functional model would be considered mechanistic. Lets say we are modelling some action/perception loop. If I propose dynamical interactions of mechanisms as a driving force, but I can't point to individual neural circuits for each mechanism- would that disqualify my model from the mechanistic club? Is it enough that the behavior of the parts could be produced by neurons? Or is it that I need a more general proof that each concept I use has a neural equivalent that has been observed? Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9192597712746432631.post-24693118968306113422021-04-22T18:29:29.021+01:002021-04-22T18:29:29.021+01:00For what it's worth, I think the same insights...For what it's worth, I think the same insights could be applied to religious instructional settings as well. What I mean is that it seems to me that most Christian churches focus on knowledge transmission (such as listening to sermons), and where action is required (such as singing worship songs), that action is not explorative so much as it is supposed to be habit forming and repetitive. Nevertheless, from my understanding of the relevant theology, Christians are supposed to do "good works". It would be fascinating to see what Christians might be like if their worship services consisted of "exploring a constrained space in which skill and knowledge emerges from the nature of the exploration."Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17872761004931424573noreply@blogger.com