Chemero (2009), Chapter 1: Hegelian Arguments in Cognitive Science

The basic thesis of RECS is that cognitive science should give up on representations (the radical bit) and focus on explaining the embodiment of cognition in a complex, perceiving-acting dynamical system. Chemero spends Chapter 1 heading off the likely initial line of resistance to this thesis; namely, the argument that 'your thesis got ruled out in the 80s by [insert name here]'. Chemero labels arguments of this type 'Hegelian' and makes a case that a) they're mostly a sign of the immaturity of modern cognitive science, but most importantly b) they don't really need to convince anyone to stop trying to develop a radical, embodied cognitive science (and that the rest of the book is therefore still worth a read). I basically agree with this analysis; in fact, we started this blog to try and address the immaturity issue in (a) (in favour of some form of (b)). So we're off to a good start!

Chemero begins by laying out a typical discussion between cognitive scientists:

Imagine the scene: An academic conference. Two cognitive scientists, casual but friendly acquaintances, are chatting in a hotel bar.

‘‘So, what are you working on now?’’
‘‘I’ve been doing some stuff with [insert one of: ecological psychology, connectionist networks, dynamical modeling, embodied cognition, situated robotics, etc.].’’
‘‘But [insert name(s) here] already showed that that approach is hopeless. The paper was published in ... ’’
‘‘Yeah, yeah. I’ve read that one. I don’t buy it at all. [Reinsert name(s) here] doesn’t really get it. You see...’’

If you’re reading this, you’ve probably taken part in a conversation like this. In fact, nearly everyone working in cognitive science is working on an approach that someone else has shown to be hopeless, usually by an argument that is more or less purely philosophical.

Chemero, 2009, pp 3

This sort of thing really is common; if I had a dollar for every conversation like this I've had, I wouldn't be so worried about the research funding climate in the UK just now. We are often told our programme of research in cognitive science are doomed to failure if it doesn't include something someone thinks is essential to cognition (such as representations). We also tend to simply ignore the argument, however, or at least not find it compelling, because our approach might not think representations (for example) are indeed necessary features of a cognitive system; not having them is therefore not a problem.

These arguments do not ever hinge on empirical results; they are rationalist. They also don't even tend to show up in other sciences but are rampant (although still unconvincing) in cognitive science. Why are these two things true? 

Chemero lays out four examples of these arguments:

1. Hegel's argument that there couldn't be a planet between Mars and Jupiter, because that would violate a specific mathematical progression he thought dictated the location of the planets;
2. Behe's creationist argument that biological systems are irreducibly complex, and thus couldn't have evolved;
3. Chomsky's argument that children acquire a grammar without enough reinforcement or information (the poverty of stimulus argument)
4. Fodor & Pylyshyn rejecting connectionist networks as models of cognitive systems because these networks are neither systematic nor representational in the manner of human cognition

These arguments all have the same basic flavour: on the basis of some claims for which there might not be any evidence (e.g. Hegel's claim that the distance between planets must follow an a priori mathematical progression) you simply rule out a competing hypothesis. These are not empirical claims; they aren't based on data, but on a theoretical assumption. Astronomy ignored Hegel and found asteroids; biology ignores Behe and continues the job of collecting empirical evidence for evolution. But cognitive science gives these sorts of arguments (Hegelian arguments) a lot of weight. 

Why? One option is that the topic of cognitive science is about different sort of stuff, and such arguments are thus applicable. Chemero rules this out on the basis that even digestion has been victim of Hegelian arguments against the hypothesis that we take nutrition on board from our food. This happened, though, in Medieval times when it was still early days and there was a competing theory around (that the atoms in our body are all copies of the atoms from Adam and allowing food to become part of us makes no sense). The point is that it was early days, in the same way as it is for cognitive science. These arguments are a symptom of the field's immaturity. 

Kuhn and immaturity

Chemero means this in the technical, Kuhnian sense. For Kuhn, a science at any given moment is in one of three phases: it is immature, it is engaged in normal science, or it is in crisis/revolution. Normal science, with it's well established and broadly accepted theoretical framework, simply doesn't find Hegelian arguments compelling because there are data on the issue which everyone agrees is valid. Immature sciences don't have this framework; it has, by definition, lots of competing theories vying for space and grant money. Arguments which are effectively incommensurable with each other will therefore be common as they try and kill each other off. This incommensurability, of course, makes them unconvincing to people in the other camp.

So the problem is merely one of the state of the art - cognitive science is young, therefore there are Hegelian arguments ruling out alternative theories left, right and centre. But they aren't a problem and no-one attempting a rethink of cognition should be concerned: these arguments are unconvincing, and the whole competing theories thing is actually a fairly healthy sign of a science in transition. The only reason to stop doing any of these is as the data roll in to decide things one way or another: in the meantime, we should embrace the parallel streams as a marketplace of ideas.

Some thoughts

Personally I'm a little concerned that cognitive science is still in this phase; the 'cognitive revolution' was 50 years ago and it's not like psychology hasn't been busy. If we can't agree on the basic questions of our discipline, we won't make a lot of progress. But given that we are clearly still in this stage (see: every conversation we have with Ken Aizawa :), Chemero's right that nothing should just get thrown out just yet on the basis of 'well, you don't include what I think is a necessary condition for cognition' - what's necessary is still up for grabs and thus a competitive marketplace of ideas might just be the price we have to pay before we settle on a theory.

So with that out of the way, Chemero can now throw his idea out into the marketplace. Chapter 2 will lay out what his idea is, and situate it historically so it seems a little less left-field.

Reference

Chemero, A. (2009). Radical Embodied Cognitive Science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Amazon.com, Amazon.co.uk, MIT Press e-book